Learn Palestinian Psychological Warfare

Since the first intifada to "Facebook in 2011 intifada, Palestinian have executed successful psychological warfare.

We can draw a map of the messages prior to September.

The Oslo accords were the most significant political achievement of the Palestinians, but psychological warfare remains their primary means for achieving political goals.

Here are some basic principles of Palestinian psychological warfare:

1. Art stretching rope - a gradual violent activities such as mortars, rockets and Grad. Every step is another hoax base of the stretching rope art tactic. So accustomed to Israel in the next few years its bombed southern region regularly and the steps being taken are mostly on the defensive basis. When Israel wakes up, it will be too late and she finds out that her hands are tied.

2. Evasion from taking of responsibility - at any time that an action was done that has a potential of causing damage to themselves, the Palestinians hurried to disregard their responsibility of their execution and to accuse someone else, in general Israel. Arguments like these accuses Israel, that after all/then it's impossible to be talked with "person" who is not rational. It was thus in the event of the driver that galloped to the a hitchhike's station and amongst people in the junction of the French's hill in Jerusalem and was shot. The Palestinians claimed that Israel is not discern between road accident to terrorist attack. Arafat claimed (March1996) that the attack in the bus's line 18 in Jerusalem executed Rahvam Zeevi.

3. The creation of opportunity and using of opportunity - promotion of false accusation in event from the start to his end and demands of committee for events like the Turkish Flotilla, the affair of Mohammed a-Dura, etc which were a pure provocations. There are also cases in which Palestinians want to use the event for production propaganda's profit: Every injury of Palestinian is an "attempt of annihilation", "ethnic cleansing", every conventional reaction of Israel and a routine patrol of Israeli Army is "an action of raid".

In June 2006, went a family from Gaza to travel in the beach and hurt from an old shell. The Palestinians exploited the event in order to accuse Israel in shooting of artillery from the sea to the family on the beach. Only few weeks later confessed the girl of the family on her bed in the hospital that her father played with an old shell he found on the beach.

4. Collapsing the systems of the enemy - the target : To create a load, expenses, to encumber on functioning and as such to represent helplessness and lack of the strengths of the government in the treatment of solving the problems. The "collapsing of systems" includes false alarms of rescue organizations, dummy bombs or information that brought to close streets and roads in order to ?luck the nerves of the drivers. Announcements of speaker of Hamas that soon likely terror attack raises the tension in Israeli Army, in the police and in Shabak, causing sometimes to cancell holidays in the security system and causes a chain reaction of tension and nervousness in the public.

5. Demonization - The horror propaganda against Israel came to represent Israel as a satanic country that executing war crimes in the Palestinian population and acting not in the accepted norms between countries.

When Hillary Clinton visited in Gaza Strip in November 1999, Soha Arafat informed her that Israel is poisoning the Palestinians with gas which is a pure lie. In addition, Hamas claimed that darkening Gaza by Israel prevents the activation of the incubators in Peggie. But Hamas "forgot" to tell that he is firing Grad missiles to the power station in South Ashkelon which supply electricity to Gaza.

In the historical vision there is no a renewal in the psychological Palestinian warfare, except for combination of the suicide bombers. The things had been done in the past and they are overt for all. The thing that pleases by the discipline of the Palestinian's psychological warfare is that the rules and the techniques is foreknown.

What remaining to the planners in the arms of the security is "to place in the formula" and to receive the outline that is futuristic of the psychological Palestinian warfare. So, possible/given to sketch far and away of reasonable map of the messages that is futuristic of the authority towards September and after him, and to prepare/take place/accordingly.

Additional Note:
“We plan to eliminate the state of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian state. We will make life unbearable for Jews by psychological warfare and population explosion. . . . We Palestinians will take over everything, including all of Jerusalem.”
~ Yasser Arafat ~

Poster Note:
This article has been written in Hebrew and translated by me. Sorry for the errors in the translation.

DR. Ron Schleifer, head of the institute to the security and communication in school to the communication, the academic center Ariel. This column including part of conclusions of study that checked the psychological palestinian warfare in the last decade that was published in the frame of the institute to the security and communication.

Arab Media Manipulation

by Dr. Alex Grobman

The Arabs carry on a continuous "war of nerves", cleverly using the press, UN and Western gullibility --or seminal Anti-Seminism--to isolate Israel and weaken it from psychologically from within and without. Here's how.

“One need not destroy one's enemy. One need only destroy his willingness to engage. “
~ Sun Tzu ~

The recent Arab riots on the Temple Mount and inside Jerusalem’s Old City, the Goldstone Report, academic and economic boycotts as well as other tactics are part of the familiar ongoing war against Israel. The Arabs employ a number of psychological techniques to demoralize Israelis in order to convince them that their county has usurped Arab lands, is unjust and morally bankrupt. Their ultimate objective is for Israel to be internationally villified, isolated and ultimately for it to cease to exist. It behooves us to study their techniques so as better to counter them.

The Arabs borrow from revolutionaries including Carlos Marighella, a leader of the Brazilian guerrilla organization ALN. Marighella urged his followers to use the mass media, foreign embassies, the U.N., international commissions, and Vatican representatives to spread their lies and false rumors in order to discredit the government. Acts of terror, assassination, sabotage and kidnappings further create an environment of uncertainty, anxiety and apprehension.

During the first Intifada (December 1987 to October 1991), the Arabs manipulated the international press by placing individuals affiliated with the PLO and other Islamic political groups into their media bureaus. Rather than hide these connections, the Arabs used them to enhance their attraction to their employers.

Developing personal relationships with Israelis who oppose Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, meeting with them in Israel and taking them on tours of the refugee camps helped solidify support for the Arabs, and created a sense of guilt among those who know little about the history of the conflict .

Semantics is another weapon used against Israel. Instead of describing insurrections as riots, the Arabs call them demonstrations. This is in keeping, they assert, with their basic right in a democracy to protest against unfair government policies. What they don’t say is that the riots are designed to hasten the demise of Israel. After the Arabs continually used the term “demonstration,” members of the media adopted it as their own.

When a demonstration becomes violent after the military intervenes to disband the crowd, the Arabs allege that Israelis are committing atrocities. This is after trying to goad the army into committing indiscriminate acts of force, particularly against women and children.

Contrived shootings, protests, arrests for the Western media is another technique Arabs use. Dutch television showed an Arab boy being aggressively arrested by Israeli soldiers while he was walking on the street. To ensure that the TV crew noticed that he was “innocent,” he yelled to them to take notice of what was happening.

An investigation later revealed that the youth had purposely violated curfew after seeing the TV crew. He knew he would be apprehended, that his violent arrest would be recorded and the broadcast would help to discredit Israel. This was an isolated event, yet Israeli intelligence claimed that journalists knew how much they would have to pay for a stone throwing or a demonstration. The Arabs instructed the journalists when and where to stand in order to get the best shot.

This was brought to an extreme at the beginning of the second intifada in 2000. Muhammad al-Dura, a 12 year-old Palestinian boy, was reportedly shot by Israelis in cross fire near the Netzarim crossing in Gaza while being shielded by his father. The episode was filmed and broadcast on France TV 2. This was later shown by Israeli physicist Nahum Shahaf and a courageous Frenchman, Philip Craszenty, using IDF and other materials, to be staged and patently false, yet in the Muslim world his name remains an infamous symbol of grievance against Israel.

Historian Richard Landes began investigating the case as a blood libel after seeing this incident as “One Jew allegedly kills a gentile child in cold blood, and all Jews everywhere are responsible. That's the beginning of the wave of anti-Semitism that literally has marked the 21st century, and we have not seen the end of it. This is where cyberspace can play a crucial role.”

Landes coined the phrase “Pallywood” to describe this and other “pernicious productions staged by Palestinians in front of (and often with cooperation from) Western camera crews, for the purpose of promoting anti-Israel propaganda by disguising it as news.”

While examining footage from another alleged incident, Landes noticed a Palestinian with “blood” on his forehead ostensibly from a head wound running without any sign of trauma.

After giving what appears to be a Molotov cocktail to a colleague, the Palestinian darts into the crowd. In the next frame, he is put on a stretcher and taken to an awaiting ambulance, while keeping his head high though allegedly suffering from a head injury. “It’s really obvious that it’s fake,” Landes concludes.

In the Gaza beach explosion on June 9, 2006, eight Palestinians were killed and 30 or more injured. Though very compelling evidence shows they were killed by Palestinian land mines, the Palestinians accused Israel.

The foreign media sided with the Arabs. Landes noted “And herein lies another real tragedy: The eagerness with which the media seize upon anything negative about Israel, and the reluctance with which they reveal anything negative about the Palestinians, have radically skewed the world's view of what's going on here.”

In Rhetoric, Aristotle claimed that “Men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth.” When it comes to the Arabs, many in the West and Israel have yet to use that natural instinct.



Arutz Sheva

How Many Palestinian Arab Refugees Were There?

by Efraim Karsh
Israel Affairs
April 2011

The number of Palestinian Arabs fleeing their homes during the 1948 war has constituted one of the most intractable bones of contentions of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not least since the Palestinians have insisted on the "right of return" of these individuals and their descendants to territory that has long been part of the state of Israel.

More than a half-century later, these exaggerated initial numbers have swollen still further: as of June 2000, according to UNRWA, the total had climbed close to three and three-quarters million, though it readily admits that the statistics are largely inflated. For its part the PLO set a still higher figure of 5 million refugees, while Israel has unofficially estimated the current number of refugees and their families at closer to 2 million.

Using a wealth of declassified Arab, Israeli, and British documents, this article seeks to provide as comprehensive and accurate an estimate as possible of the actual number of refugees in the wake of the 1948 war.

At the end of the war, the Israeli government set the number of Palestinian refugees at 550,000-600,000; the British Foreign Office leaned toward the higher end of this estimate. But within a year, as large masses of people sought to benefit from the unprecedented influx of international funds to the area, some 962,000 alleged refugees had been registered with the newly-established UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

The extraordinary coverage of the 1948 war notwithstanding, the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem during the five-and-a-half months of fighting, from the partition resolution of November 29, 1947, to the proclamation of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948, passed virtually unnoticed by the international community. Nor for that matter did the Arab states, burdened as they were with a relentless flow of refugees, or even the Palestinian leadership itself, have a clear idea of the dispersal's full magnitude, as demonstrated by the mid-June 1948 estimate of the prominent Palestinian leader, Emile Ghouri, of the number of refugees at 200,000: less than two thirds the actual figure. A few weeks later, after thousands more Arabs had become refugees, a Baghdad radio commentator was still speaking of 300,000 evacuees "who are forced to flee from the Jews as the French were forced to flee from the Nazis." Taking their cue from these claims, W. De St. Aubin, delegate of the League of Red Cross Societies to the Middle East, estimated the number of Arab refugees (in late July) at about 300,000, while Sir Raphael Cilento, director of the UN Disaster Relief Project (DRP) in Palestine, set the number at 300,000-350,000 (in early August).

Paradoxically it was the Israelis who initially came with the highest, and most accurate, estimates. In early June Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was told by Yossef Weitz of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) that "some 123,000 Arabs left 155 villages in the Jewish state's territory; another 22,000 left 35 villages outside the Jewish state: a total of 145,000 evacuees and 190 villages. Seventy-seven thousand Arabs left five cities in the Jewish state's territory (Haifa, Beisan, Tiberias, Safad, Samakh). Another 73,000 left two cities [designed to remain] outside the state (Jaffa and Acre). Forty thousand Arabs left Jerusalem: a total of 190,000 from eight cities. All in all, 335,000 Arabs fled (including 200,000 from the UN ascribed Jewish territory)."

A comprehensive report by the Hagana's intelligence service, comprising a detailed village-by-village breakdown of the exodus, set the number of Palestinian Arab evacuees in the six-month period between December 1, 1947 and June 1, 1948, at 391,000: 239,000 from the UN-ascribed Jewish state, 122,000 from the territory of the prospective Arab state, and 30,000 from Jerusalem. Another exhaustive Israeli study set the number of refugees (in late October) at 460,000, almost evenly divided between the rural and urban sectors.

This estimate was substantially higher than the 360,000 figure in the report of the UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, submitted to the General Assembly on September 16, or Cilento's revised estimate of 400,300 a couple of weeks later, and was virtually identical to the supplementary report submitted on October 18 by Bernadotte's successor, Ralph Bunche, which set the number of refugees at 472,000 and anticipated the figure to reach a maximum of slightly over 500,000 in the near future.

By now, however, the Arabs had dramatically upped the ante. In a memorandum dispatched to the heads of the Arab states and Arab League Secretary-General Abdel Rahman Azzam in mid-August, the Palestine Office in Amman, an organization operating under the auspices of the Transjordan government, estimated the total number of refugees at 700,000, of whom 500,000 were in Palestine and the rest in the neighboring Arab states. The memo struck a responsive chord, for in October the Arab League set the number of refugees at 631,967, and by the end of the month official Arab estimates ranged between 740,000 and 780,000. When the newly-established United Nations Relief for Palestine refugees (UNRPR) began operating in December 1948, it found 962,643 refugees on its relief rolls.

In conversations with British diplomats (in early October) Cilento described the figures supplied by the Arab authorities as unreliable, claiming that they increased from week to week in all areas irrespective of known movements of refugees from place to place. A large number of refugees had, for example, moved from the Nablus area to the Hauran in Syria while others from Jericho, Jerusalem and Transjordan had moved to Gaza. Similarly, at least 2,000 refugees had recently moved from the Egyptian port town of Kantara, on the Suez Canal, to Gaza. Yet the number of refugees in the areas from which these movements had taken place was in all cases reported as increasing instead of decreasing. Similar exaggerations were made in Syria where, according to Bunche's October report, the authorities claimed the existence of 30,000 refugees whereas the actual figure was no more than half that size.

Cilento expected as many as 400,000 Arabs to apply for UN relief in the coming winter on top of the 360,000-390,000 registered refugees, though these were not genuine refugees in the sense that they were living in their own homes and had not been "displaced." This, however, didn't prevent him, when the prediction was vindicated before the end of the year, from raising the number of refugees to 750,000. St. Aubin, who in September 1948 became the DRP's director of field operations, went a step further by placing the figure (in July 1949) at "approximately one million."

Admitting to having "some difficulty in separating out the real refugees from the rest, and in explaining the reasons for doing so to the Arab authorities," Cilento attributed this chaotic situation to a number of reasons:

* Refugees were registered on arrival and fed but their names were not struck off the list if they moved or died;
* Refugees moving from one area to another would check in and be fed at several points en route and at each would be added to the list of refugees in the area, in this way numbers increased on paper in areas vacated as well as at final destination;
* Local destitute persons were included in numbers although they were not properly refugees;
* Fraud and misrepresentation by officials and others to utilize supplies etc.;
* There were people who left their homes owing to disturbed conditions but returned to them shortly afterward, yet were briefly registered as refugees and the records remained.

Sir John Troutbeck, head of the British Middle East office in Cairo, got a first-hand impression of this pervasive inflation of refugee numbers during a fact-finding mission to Gaza in June 1949. "The Quakers have nearly 250,000 refugees on their books," he reported to London.

They admit however that the figures are unreliable, as it is impossible to stop all fraud in the making of returns. Deaths for example are never registered nor are the names struck off the books of those who leave the district clandestinely. Some names too are probably registered more than once for the extra rations. But the Quakers assured me that they have made serious attempts to carry out a census and believe they have more information in that respect than the Red Cross organizations which are working in other areas. Their figures include Bedouin whom they feed and care for just like other refugees. They seemed a little doubtful whether this was a right decision, but once it had been taken it could not be reversed, and in any case the Bedouin, though less destitute than most of the refugees proper, are thought to have lost a great part of their possessions. They and the other refugees live in separate camps and in a state of mutual antipathy.

This was hardly a novel phenomenon. Population figures of Palestinian Arab society, especially of rural Muslim communities, were notoriously unreliable, based as they were on exaggerated information provided by village headmen in order to obtain greater government support. As explained in the preface to the mandatory government's Village Statistics 1945, for all the "very detailed work" invested in this comprehensive compendium of rural Palestine, its estimates "cannot… be considered as other than rough estimates which in some instances may ultimately be found to differ even considerably, from the actual figures."

The supplementary volume to the government's Survey of Palestine (1946), compiled in June 1947 for the information of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), elaborated on the problematic nature of official demographic statistics:

For the years 1943-46 an investigation recently carried out by the Department of Statistics revealed that many cases of death, especially in rural areas, have not been reported. These omissions (which are mainly due to the attempt to obtain food rations of deceased persons) seriously impair the reliability of the death rates (particularly infant mortality rates) and that of the rate of natural increase. On the other hand, they are not of such magnitude as to effect seriously the estimates of total population.

This may well have been the case. But then, if accepting the Supplement's estimate of 1.3 million Palestinian Arabs at the end of 1946 (the actual figure was most probably 5%-6% lower) the number of refugees could by no stretch of the imagination approximate the million mark for the simple reason that some 550,000-600,00 Arabs who lived in the mandatory districts of Samaria, Jerusalem, and Gaza (which subsequently became the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after their respective occupation by Transjordan and Egypt) remained in situ, while another 160,000 Arabs remained in, or returned to, Israel. This, in turn, puts the number of refugees at 540,000-590,000. Likewise, according to an extrapolation of the Village Statistics 1945, the non-Jewish population of the area that was to become Israeli territory at the end the war amounted, in April 1948, to some 696,000-726,800. Deducting Israel's 160,000-strong postwar Arab population from this figure would leave 536,000-566,800 refugees beyond Israel's frontiers.

As can be seen below, my own calculations, based on British, Jewish, and to a lesser extent Arab, population figures of all identified rural and urban localities abandoned during the war, amounts to 583,000-609,000 refugees.

The Palestinian Arab Exodus 1947-48

CITIES

Acre – 13,510 (3,885 remained).

Beersheba – 6,490.

Beisan – 5,540.

Haifa – 70,910 (5,000 remained).

Jaffa – 70,730 (4,000-5,000 remained).

Jerusalem – 65,010 (some 30,000 fled).

Lydda & Ramle – 35,078 (2,500 remained).

Majdal – 10,900.

Safad – 10,210.

Tiberias – 5,770.

Total: 247,403-248,403

VILLAGES

GALILEE DISTRICT

Acre Sub-District

Amqa – 1,240, Jul. 9, 1948.

Arab Samniya – 200,

Bassa – 2,950-3,140 (includes Ma'sub), May 14, 1948.

Birwa – 1,460, Jun. 11, 1948.

Damun – 1,310, Jul. 14-18, 1948.

Deir Qasi – 1,190 (including Mansura), Oct. 30, 1948.

Ghabisiya – 690-740, May 22, 1948.

Iqrit – 490-520, Apr. 26-Oct. 30, 1948.

Kabri – 1,530-1,640, May 5-22, 1948.

Kafr Inan – 360, Oct. 30, 1948.

Khirbat Iribbin – 360 (including Jurdeih & Khirbat Idmith),

Khirbat Jiddin – no people according to the Village Statistics

Kuweikat – 1,050, Jul. 9, 1948.

Manshiya – 810-1,140, May 17, 1948.

Mansura – see Deir Qasi.

Mi'ar – 770, Oct. 30, 1948.

Nabi Rubin – see Tarbikha.

Nahr – 610, May 22, 1948.

Ruweis – 330, Jul. 18, 1948.

Suhmata – 1,130, Oct. 29/30, 1948.

Sumeiriya – 760-820, May 14, 1948.

Suruh – see Tarbikha.

Tell – May 14, 1948.

Tarbikha – 1,000 (including Nabi Rubin & Suruh), Oct. 30, 1948.

Umm Faraj – 800, May 22, 1948.

Zib (includes Manawat) – 1,910-2,050, May 14, 1948.

Beisan Sub-District

Arida – 150, May 20, 1948.

Ashrafiya – 230, May 12, 1948.

Bawati - 520-700, Mar. 30, 1948.

Bira – 220-500, May 16, 1948.

Danna – 160-400, May 16-28, 1948.

Farawna – 330-350, May 11, 1948.

Ghazawiya – 1,020, late May 1948.

Hamidiya – 220-300, Apr. 6-May 12, 1948.

Hamra, 730, May 1, 1948.

Jabbul – 250-370, May 1-18, 1948.

Kafra – 400-700, May 16, 1948.

Kaukab Hawa – 30-600, May 14, 1948.

Khuneizir – 260-400, May 20, 1948.

Masil Jizl – 100, mid-May 1948.

Murassas – 460-600, May 16, 1948.

Qumiya – 320-440, Mar. 30, 1948.

Safa – 650, May 20, 1948.

Sakhina – 200-530, May 16, 1948.

Samiriya – 250-500, May 27, 1948.

Sirin – 600-820, Apr. 24, 1948.

Tell Shauk – 120, probably in mid-May 1948.

Tira – 120-150, Apr. 15, 1948.

Zab'a – 170, May 12, 1948.

Yubla – 150-250, May 16, 1948.

Zir'in – 1,300, May 1, 1948.

Nazareth Sub-District

Indur – 620, May 24, 1948.

Ma'lul – 690, Jul. 15-18, 1948.

Mujeidil – 1,600-1,900, Jul. 15-18, 1948.

Saffuriyya – 4,320-4,330, Jul. 15-16, 1948.

Safad Sub-District

Abil Qamh – 230-330, May 10, 1948.

Abisiya – 830-1,220, May 25, 1948.

Akbara – 390-410, May 10, 1948.

Alma – 950, Oct. 30, 1948.

Ammuqa Tahta & Fawqa – 140, May 24, 1948.

Arab Shamalina – see Buteiha.

Arab Zubeid – Apr. 20, 1948.

Azaziyat – 390, Apr. 30-May 1, 1948.

Beisamun – 20, May 25, 1948.

Biriya – 240, May 2, 1948.

Buteiha - 650 (including Arab Shamalina), May 4, 1948.

Buweiziya – 510-540, May 11, 1948.

Dahariya – 350, May 10, 1948.

Dallata – 360, Oct. 30, 1948.

Darbashiya – 310, early May 1948.

Dawwara – 700, May 25, 1948.

Deishum – 590, May 9, 1948-Oct. 30, 1948.

Dirdara – Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Ein Zeitun – 620-820, May 2, 1948.

Fara – 820, Oct, 30, 1948.

Farradiya – 670, Oct. 30-Nov. 6, 1948.

Fir'im – 740, May 2-26, 1948.

Ghabbatiya – 60, probably in late October 1948.

Ghuraba – 220, May 1-28, 1948.

Hamra – May 1, 1948.

Harrawi – May 25, 1948.

Hunin – 1,620, May 3-5, 1948.

Husseiniya – 340 (including Tuleil), Apr. 21, 1948.

Jahula – 420, date not known.

Jauna – 1,150, May 9, 1948.

Jubb Yusuf – 170, early May 1948.

Kafr Bir'im – 710, Oct. 30, 1948.

Khalisa – 1,840, May 11, 1948.

Khirbat Muntar – n.a., May 7, 1948.

Khisas – 470-530, Mar. 26-May 24, 1948.

Khiyam Walid – 210-280, Mar. 29-May 1, 1948.

Kirad Baqqara – 360, Apr. 22, 1948.

Kirad Ghanama - 350, Apr. 22, 1948.

Lazzaza – 230, May 21, 1948.

Madahil – 410, Apr. 7-30, 1948.

Malikiya – 360, May 15-Oct. 30, 1948.

Mallaha – 890, May 25, 1948.

Mansura– 360, May 25, 1948.

Mansurat Kheit – 200-900, Jan. 18, 1948.

Marus – 80, May 26, 1948.

Meirun – 290, May 29-Oct. 29, 1948.

Mughr Kheit – 490, Jan. 18, 1948.

Muftakhira – 350 – May 1-16, 1948.

Nabi Yusha – 70, May 16-17, 1948.

Naima – 1,240-1,310, May 14, 1948.

Qabba'a - 460, May 2, 1948.

Qadas – 320-390, May 28, 1948.

Qaddita – 240, May 11, 1948.

Qeitiya – 940, May 2-19, 1948.

Qudeiriya – 390, May 4, 1948.

Ras Ahmar – 620, Oct. 30, 1948.

Sabalan – 70, apparently in late October 1948.

Safsaf – 910, Oct. 29, 1948.

Saliha – 1,070, Oct. 30, 1948.

Salihiya – 1,520, May 25, 1948.

Sammui – 310, May 12-Oct. 30, 1948.

Sanbariya – 130, date not known.

Sa'sa – 1,130, Oct. 29-30, 1948.

Shauka Tahta – 200, Feb. 2-May 14, 1948.

Shuna – 170, date not known.

Teitaba – 530, Oct. 30, 1948.

Tuleil – see Husseiniya.

Ulmaniya – 260, Feb. 25-Apr. 20, 1948.

Weiziya – date not known.

Yarda – Jul. 10, 1948.

Zanghariya – 840, May 4, 1948.

Zawiya – 760, May 24, 1948.

Zuk Fauqani & Zuk Tahtani – 1,050, May 11-21, 1948.

Tiberias Sub-District

Dalhamiya – 410, probably late April.

Ghuweir Abu Shusha – 1,240, Apr. 21-28, 1948.

Hadatha – 520-550, Mar. 30-May 12, 1948.

Hittin – 1,190, Jul. 17, 1948.

Kafr Sabt – 480, Apr. 22, 1948.

Khirbat Qadish – 410, Apr. 19-20, 1948.

Khirbat Wa'ra Sauda – 1,870 (Mawasi & Wuheib), date not known.

Lubiya – 2,350, Jul. 17, 1948.

Ma'dhar – 480-510, Apr.16-May 12, 1948.

Majdal – 240-360, Apr. 22, 1948.

Manara – 490, Apr. 10, 1948.

Mansura – 360, May 25, 1948

Nasr al-Din – 90 - Apr. 12, 1948.

Nimrin – 320, Jul. 17-18.

Nuqeib (includes Samra) - 290-320, Apr. 23-24, 1948.

Samakh – 3,460-3,660, Apr. 29, 1948.

Samakiya – 380, May 4, 1948.

Samra – see Nuqeib.

Shajara, 720-770, Apr. 21-May 6, 1948.

Tabigha – 330, May 1, 1948.

Ubeidiya – 870-920, Mar. 5-Apr. 21, 1948.

Ulam - 720- Mar. 30-May 12, 1948.

Yaquq – 210, Jul. 18, 1948.

HAIFA DISTRICT

Haifa Sub-District

Abu Shusha – 720, Apr. 9-12.

Abu Zueriq – 550, Apr. 12, 1948.

Arab Fuqara – 310-340, Apr. 10, 1948.

Arab Nufeiat – 820-910, Mar. 30-Apr. 10, 1948.

Atlit – 150, date not known.

Balad Sheikh – 4,120-4,500, Jan. 7-Apr. 25, 1948.

Bureika – 290, Mar. 6-Apr. 26, 1948.

Buteimat – 110, Apr. 12-May 13, 1948.

Daliyat Ruha – 280-310, Apr. 12, 1948.

Dumeira – 620, date not known.

Ein Ghazal – 2,170-2,410, Apr. 25-July 26, 1948.

Ein Haud – 650, Jul. 17, 1948.

Ghubaiyat, 1,130-1,260 (includes Naghnagiya), Apr. 9-13, 1948.

Hawsha – n.a., Apr. 4-19, 1948.

Ijzim – 2,970, Apr. 25-July 26, 1948.

Jaba – 1,140, Jul. 25, 1948.

Jalama – n.a, Jun. 1, 1948.

Kabara -120, apparently late April-early May 1948.

Kafr Lam – 340-380, May 13-15-Jul. 16, 1948.

Kafrin – 920; April 12, 1948.

Khirbat Damum – 340; late April 1948.

Khirbat Kasayir – Apr. 27, 1948.

Khirbat Lid – 640, mid-April-mid-May, 1948.

Khubbeiza – 290, apparently in mid May 1948.

Mansi – 1,200, Apr. 12-15, 1948.

Mazar – 210, May 17, 1948.

Mazra'a – 460, Feb. 6, 1948.

Naghnagiya – see Ghubaiyat.

Qannir – 750, Apr. 5-25, 1948.

Qisariya – 930-1,240, Jan. 12-Feb. 15, 1948.

Rihaniya – 240-340, Apr. 12, 1948.

Sabbarin – 1,700-1,880, May 14, 1948.

Sarafand – 290, early May 1948-Jul. 17, 1948.

Sarkas – Apr. 15-26, 1948.

Sindiyana – 1,250-1,390, May 2-14, 1948.

Tantura – 1,490-1,650, May 6-21, 1948.

Tira – 5,270, Apr. 22-Jul. 16, 1948.

Umm Shauf – 480, May 14, 1948.

Umm Zinat – 1,470, Apr. 26-May 15, 1948.

Wadi Ara – 260, Feb. 27, 1948

Yajur – 610 – Feb. 18-Apr. 25, 1948.

SAMARIA DISTRICT

Jenin Sub-District

Ein Mansi – 90, date not known.

Kufeir – 140, Apr. 27, 1948.

Lajjun – 600, Apr. 16-May 30, 1948.

Mazar – 270-350, May 30, 1948.

Nuris – 570-700, May 30, 1948.

Zir'in – 1,300-1,420, May 28, 1948.

Tulkarm Sub-District

Arab Balawina, Dec. 31, 1947.

Arab Huweitat – Mar. 15, 1948.

Arab Zubeidat (Kafr Zibad) – 1,590, Apr. 16, 1948.

Kafr Saba – 1,270-1,370, May 15, 1948.

Khirbat Azzun (Tabsur) – 50, Dec. 21, 1947-Apr. 3, 1948.

Khirbat Beit Lid – 460-500, Mar. 20-Apr. 5, 1948.

Khirbat Jalama – 70, early February 1948.

Khirbat Manshiya – 260-280, Apr. 15, 1948.

Khirbat Zalafa – 210-370, Apr. 15, 1948.

Miska – 650-880 – Apr. 15, 1948.

Qaqun – 1,970, May 4 & Jun. 4, 1948.

Umm Khalid – 970-1050, Mar. 20, 1948.

Wadi Hawarith – 1,330-1,440, Mar. 15, 1948.

JERUSALEM DISTRICT

Hebron Sub-District

Ajjur – 3,720 (including Khirbat Ammuriya), Oct. 22-24, 1948.

Barqusiya – 330, Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Beit Jibrin – 2,430, Jul. 13-14-Oct. 27, 1948.

Beit Nattif – 2,150, Oct. 22, 1948.

Dawayima – 3,710, Oct. 29, 1948.

Deir Dubban – 730, Oct. 22-23, 1948.

Deir Nakh-Khas – 600, Oct. 29, 1948.

Kidna – 450, Oct. 22-24, 1948.

Mughallis – 540, Jul. 16, 1948.

Qubeiba – 1,060, Oct. 28, 1948.

Ra'na – 190, Oct. 22-23, 1948.

Tell Safi – 1,290, Jul. 9, 1948.

Zakariya – 1,180, Jul. 22-23-Oct. 22-24, 1948.

Zeita – 330, Jul. 9-18, 1948.

Zikrin – 330-960, Oct. 22-24, 1948.

Jerusalem Sub-District

Allar – 440, Oct. 22, 1948.

Aqqur – 40, Jul. 13, 1948.

Artuf – 350, Jul. 17-18, 1948.

Beit Itab – 540, Oct. 21, 1948.

Beit Mahsir – 2,400, May 10, 1948.

Beit Naqquba – 240, Jul. 8, 1948.

Beit Thul – 260, date not known.

Beit Umm Meis – 70, Jul. 15, 1948.

Buerij – 720, Jul. 15-16, 1948.

Deir Aban - Oct. 19, 1948.

Deir Amr – 10, Jul. 14, 1948.

Deir Hawa – 60, Oct. 19, 1948.

Deir Rafat – 430, Jul. 17-18, 1948.

Deir Sheikh – 220, Oct. 21, 1948.

Deir Yasin – 610-650, Apr. 9-10, 1948.

Ein Karim – 3,180-3,390, Apr. 10-21 & Jul. 10-17, 1948.

Ishwa – 620, Jul. 10-18, 1948.

Islin – 260, Jul. 10, 1948.

Jarash – 190, Oct. 21, 1948.

Jura – 420, late Jul. 1948.

Kasla – 280, Jul. 14, 1948.

Khirbat Ismallah – 20, date not known.

Khirbat Lauz – 450, Jul. 13-14, 1948.

Khirbat Umur – 270, Oct. 21, 1948.

Lifta – 2,550-2,730, Dec. 31, 1947-early January 1948.

Maliha – 1,940-2,070, Apr. 21-May 6, 1948 & Jul. 14, 1948.

Nataf – 40, Apr. 15, 1948.

Qabu – 260, Oct. 21, 1948.

Qaluniya – 910-970, Apr. 10-May 3, 1948.

Qastel - 90-100- late March 1948-May 3, 1948.

Ras Abu Ammar – 620, Oct. 21, 1948.

Sar'a – 340, Jul. 10-14, 1948.

Saris – 560-600, Apr. 16-May 3, 1948.

Sataf – 540, Jul. 13-14, 1948.

Suba – 620, Jul. 12/13, 1948.

Sufla – 60, Oct. 21, 1948.

Walaja – 1,650, Oct. 21, 1948.

LYDDA DISTRICT

Jaffa Sub-District

Abbasiya – see Yahudiya.

Abu Kishk – 1,900 – Mar. 30, 1948.

Beit Dajan – 3,840, Apr. 25-May 1, 1948.

Biyar Adas – 300, Apr. 12, 1948.

Fajja – 1200-1,570, Mar. 17-May 15, 1948.

Haram - see Saiduna Ali.

Jalil – 600-1,020, Mar. 23-Apr. 3, 1948.

Jammasin – 1,810-2,050, Jan. 7-Mar. 17, 1948.

Jarisha – 190, apparently in mid-May 1948.

Kafr Ana – 2,000-3,020, Apr. 17-25, 1948.

Kheiriya – 1,420-1,600, Apr. 25, 1948.

Mas'udiya – 850, Dec. 25, 1947.

Mirr – 170-190, Feb. 3-15, 1948.

Muweilih – 360, Jul. 9, 1948.

Rantiya – 590, Apr. 28-May 13, 1948.

Safiriya – 3,070, apparently in late April 1948.

Saiduna Ali- 520-880, Feb. 3, 1948.

Salama – 6,730-7,610, Apr. 25, 1948.

Saqiya – 1,100-1,240, Apr. 25, 1948.

Sawalima – 800, Apr. 20, 1948.

Sheik Muwannis – 1,930-2,000, Dec. 1, 1947-Mar. 30, 1948.

Sumeil – see Mas'udiya.

Yahudiya – 5,650-6,560, May 4-Jul. 10, 1948.

Yazur – 4,030, May 1, 1948.

Ramle Sub-District

Abu Fadl (Sautariya) – 510, Apr. 7-May 9, 1948.

Abu Shusha – 870-950, May 14-20, 1948.

Aqir – 2,480-2,710, May 4-6, 1948.

Barfiliya – 730, Jul. 15-17, 1948.

Barriya – 510, May 1-Jul. 10-11, 1948.

Bashshit – 510-1,770, May 12-13, 1948.

Beit Jiz – 550-600, Apr. 20, 1948.

Beit Nabala – 630-2,310, May 13, 1948.

Beit Shanna – 210, date not known.

Beit Susin – 210, Apr. 20, 1948.

Bir Ma'in – 510, Jul. 15-16, 1948.

Bir Salim – 410-950, May 9, 1948.

Burj – 480, Jul. 15-16, 1948.

Daniyal – 410, Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Deir Abu Salama – 60, Jul. 13, 1948.

Deir Aiyub – 320, May 16, 1948.

Deir Muheisin 460-500, Apr. 7-20, 1948.

Deir Tarif – 1,750, Jul. 9-11, 1948.

Haditha – 760, Jul. 10-12, 1948.

Idnibba – 490, Jul. 9-16, 1948.

Innaba – 1,420, Jul. 10-16, 1948.

Jilya – 330, Jul. 16, 1948.

Jimzu – 1,510, Jul. 10, 1948.

Kharruba – 170, Jul. 11, 1948.

Kheima – 190, Jul. 16, 1948.

Khirbat Beit Far – 300, date not known.

Khirbat Buweira – 190, date not known.

Khirbat Dhuheiriya – 100, Jul. 10-11, 1948.

Khirbat Zakariya – date not known.

Khulda – 260-300, Apr. 7-21, 1948.

Latrun – 190, May 16, 1948.

Majdal Yaba – 1,520, Jul. 12, 1948.

Mansura – 90-100, Dec. 22-29, 1947-Apr. 20, 1948.

Mughar – 1,740-1,900, May 15-18, 1948.

Mukheizin – 200-310, Dec. 29, 1947.

Muzeiri'a – 1,160, Jul. 16-18, 1948.

Na'ana – 1,470-2,270, May 14-Jun. 12, 1948.

Nabi Rubin – 1,420, Jun. 1, 1948.

Qatra – 1,210-1,320, May 17, 1948.

Qazaza – 940, Apr. 17-Jul. 16, 1948.

Qubab – 1,980-2,160, Apr. 20-Jun. 4, 1948.

Qubeiba – 1,720-1,870, May 27-Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Qula – 1,010, Jul. 11-18, 1948.

Sajad – 370, Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Salbit – 510, Jul. 16-17, 1948.

Sarafand Amar – 1,950, probably in mid-May 1948.

Sarafand Kharab – 1,040-1,130, Apr. 20, 1948.

Seidun – 210-230, Jan. 1, 1948.

Shahma – 280-310, May 14, 1948.

Shilta – 100, Jul. 17-18, 1948.

Tina – 750, Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Tira – 1,290, Jul. 10, 1948.

Umm Kalkha – 60, date not known.

Wadi Hunein – 1,620-1,770, Jan. 5-Apr. 17, 1948.

Yibna – 5,400-5,920, Jun. 4-5, 1948.

Zarnuqa – 2,380-2,600, May 27, 1948.

GAZA DISTRICT

Gaza Sub-District

Arab Sukreir – 390-430, Jan. 25, 1948.

Barbara – 2,410, Nov. 30, 1948.

Barqa – 890-980, May 13, 1948.

Batani Sharqi – 650-710, May 11-13, 1948.

Batani Gharbi – 980, Jun. 10-11, 1948.

Beit Affa – 700, May 23-Nov. 10, 1948.

Beit Daras – 2,750-3,010, May 11-12, 1948.

Beit Jirja – 940, Nov. 5, 1948.

Beit Tima – 1,060, May 29-31, 1948.

Bi'lin – 180, Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Bureir – 2,740-4,000, May 12, 1948.

Deir Suneid – 730, late October-early November 1948.

Dimra – 520, late October-early November 1948.

Faluja – 4,670, Oct. 16, 1948.

Hamama – 5,000, Jun. 9-Nov. 30, 1948.

Hatta – 970, Jul. 17-18, 1948.

Hirbiya – 2,240, Nov. 5-30, 1948.

Huj – 800-810, May 28, 1948.

Huleiqat – 420, May 12-Oct. 29, 1948.

Ibdis – 540, May 23, 1948.

Iraq Manshiya – 2,010, Oct. 16-17, 1948.

Iraq Suweidan – 660, Jul. 9-Nov. 10, 1948.

Isdud – 4,620, Nov. 30, 1948.

Jaladiya – 360, May 23-Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Jiya – 1,230, Nov. 5-30, 1948.

Julis – 1,030-1,130, May 23-Jun. 10-11, 1948.

Jura – 2,420, Nov. 5, 1948.

Juseir – 1,180, late May or early June 1948.

Karatiya, 1,370, May 23, 1948.

Kaufakha – 500, Aug. 16-Sept. 24, 1948.

Kaukaba – 680, May 12-Oct. 18, 1948.

Khirbat Khisas – 150, Nov. 30, 1948.

Masmiya Kabira – 2,520, Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Masmiya Saghira – 530, Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Muharraqa – 580-1,100, May 25-28, 1948.

Najd – 600-620, May 12, 1948.

Ni'ilya – 1,310, Nov. 5-30, 1948.

Qastina – 890, Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Sawafir Gharbiya – 1,000-1,030, May 15-18, 1948.

Sawafir Shamaliya, 680, May 11-18, 1948.

Sawafir Sharqiyya – 970, May 15-18, 1948.

Sumsum – 1,200-1,360, May 12, 1948.

Summeil – 950, Jul. 9-10, 1948.

Tell Turmus – 760, Jul. 9, 1948.

Yasur – 1,070, Jun. 10-11, 1948.

Beersheba Sub-District

Bir Asluj – Jun. 11, 1948.

Jammama – 150, May 22, 1948.

GALILEE DISTRICT (Sub Total)

Acre Sub-District 20,950-21,860

Beisan Sub-District 9,960-13,640

Nazareth Sub-District 7,230-7,540

Safad Sub-District 34,320-36,030

Tiberias Sub-District 17,430-17,940

HAIFA DISTRICT (Sub Total)

Haifa Sub-District 35,290-37,120

SAMARIA DISTRICT (Sub Total)

Jenin Sub-District 2,970-3,300

Tulkarm Sub-District 8,830-9,570

JERUSALEM DISTRICT (Sub Total)

Hebron Sub-District 19,040-19,670

Jerusalem-Sub-District 22,260-22,930

LYDDA DISTRICT (Sub Total)

Jaffa Sub-District 39,060-43,670

Ramle Sub-District 47,940-54,410

GAZA DISTRICT (Sub Total)

Gaza Sub-District 58,850-61,400

Beersheba Sub-District 150

Villages Total 324,280-349,230

Cities Total 247,403-248,403

Negev Bedouins 30,510

Refugees Settled in Israeli Localities other than their Original Sites 19,072

Palestine Grand Total: 583,121-609,071



Me Forum.Org

Israel's 1967 Lines? No, Thanks

Raanan Shaked explains the real reason for Israel’s refusal to withdraw to 1967 borders.

by Raanan Shaked

To be honest, I don’t want to return to the 1967 borders. It’s too damn crowded here as it is.

I realize that this is a crappy reason for giving up on comprehensive regional peace, but I’m almost willing to bet that this is the reason why most Israelis, including professional peace fans such as myself, do not really want to return to the 1967 lines.

It appears to us that we have a very small state as it is. Indeed, as it is, everyone around here steps on each other’s foot. As it is, a residential tower is being constructed under my sink. As it is, the feeling around here on Shabbat is that there’s nowhere else to run – the cement, the dirt, the tin signs, and mostly... these Israelis – they’re everywhere! And we’re out of space.

Am I joking here? Well, not entirely. The notion of a “Jewish State” to be established on land roughly 10% of Idaho’s size was a bad joke to begin with. This is a simple calculation error: If you take into account the fact that there are some 14 million Jews in the world who are all supposed to live here eventually, and if you take into account the fact that the State of Israel’s size is what is known as “George’s farm” in Texas, you immediately understand that a “home for the Jewish people” in fact meant “slums for the Jewish people.”

I realize that the “it’s too crowded here” argument doesn’t sound impressive, yet nonetheless, it is the only reason why Israelis don’t really want to hear about the “1967 borders.” It’s not that we are actually using most of this extra territory, yet when we are being asked to crowd a little more, we feel they went a little too far.

This is the kind of psyche that Americans are unfamiliar with: For them, there is no such thing as “crowded.” They can always disappear in the endless spaces of South Dakota or in the deserts of Nevada. Space is not a problem. There’s space, and right next to it there’s more space.

In Israel we’re out of space. Not only don’t we have another state, the existing state it too small for us by two sizes. Our beloved Obama, how about you get stuck in the holiday traffic jams for an hour and a half in an attempt to make it to your vacation at the Bed & Breakfast, where 15 Israeli families with their vocal children are already waiting for you?

This Bed & Breakfast, by the way, is on the Golan Heights – territory that the 1967 lines also seek to deprive from us, and now of all times, when the Cross-Israel Highway makes the drive so much shorter! The Golan Heights – apparently the only Tuscany we shall ever be able to reach without flying there – is Israel’s only ventilation outlet and escape route these days. How did we ever manage to live without it before 1967? Well, there used to be fewer than three million people here back then and we had a whole state at our disposal, including some nature. Since then, we used all of it. Twice.

I realize that “it’s really crowded here, and besides, haven’t you been to the Golan Heights? Isn’t it lovely? Wouldn’t it be a shame to give it up?” doesn’t quite sound like the kind of argument we can present in Washington: It will melt on the plane. Yet nonetheless, at least for Israelis my age and younger – those who were born in the extended version of the State of Israel – The “1967 borders” sound a little like “go back to your room and stay there.”

It’s childish, it’s retarded, and it’s completely inadmissible. Yet still, this is what all of us think to ourselves when we are told “1967 lines” – we don’t feel like it. So at least let’s be honest with ourselves: This is not about “defensible borders” or any kind of similar security nonsense; we refuse to return to the 1967 borders simply because it seems too crowded and depressing. Besides, you can’t relocate the Golan Heights Winery to the Negev without changing the brand name.



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